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Products Liability: Retailer May Have Duty to Warn
Even Though Product Is Not in a Defective Condition
Unreasonably Dangerous to Plaintiff
Vernon Bigham was severely burned by a "flashover"' while he
was repairing high voltage electrical equipment at a Northern States
Power Company (NSP) substation. Claiming that his injuries were
made more severe because his work clothes had melted and adhered
to his skin, Bigham sued J.C. Penney Company (Penney), the seller
of his clothes, in negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability
in tort. Bigham alleged that the work clothes were unreasonably dan-
gerous because the fabric used in the clothing was of a type that melts
in the presence of intense heat,2 and that Penney was negligent in
selling the clothing and in failing to warn of its propensities. NSP was
joined as a third party defendant.3 In answer to special verdict inter-
rogatories, the jury found that the work clothes were not in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff, and that there was
no breach of warranty.4 The jury also found that all three parties were
1. The flashover was an electric arc that radiated exteme heat. Bigham v. J.C.
Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Minn. 1978). Such an arc can have a temperature
of 11,000 degrees Fahrenheit at its center, and may produce temperatures of 3,000 to
6,000 degrees in the immediate area. Record, vol. III, at 34, vol. IX, at 37, Bigham v.
J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978).
2. At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the synthetic fabric
used in his work clothing melts at a lower temperature than that at which cotton
clothing bums, and that when subjected to heat, the synthetic clothing melts and
adheres to the skin, causing severe bums. Record, vol. IV at 69. Plaintiff sought
damages only for the exacerbated injuries caused by the clothing, and not for injuries
which would have occurred in any event. 268 N.W.2d at 895; see note 7 infra and
accompanying text.
3. 268 N.W.2d at 895. Plaintiff did not sue NSP, his employer, because he had
recovered workers' compensation benefits and could not obtain a tort judgment against
his employer due to the exclusive liability provisions of the Minnesota Workers' Com-
pensation Act. MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1978). At the time Bigham was tried, however,
there was nothing to prevent defendant Penney from impleading NSP for contribution
and indemnity. See note 7 infra.
4. The questions of the special verdict form dealing with liability, and the jury's
answers, read in part as follows:
Section One
1. When J.C. Penney Company sold the Big Mac work clothing to Mrs.
Bigham, was it in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plain-
tiff, Vernon Bigham?
Answer No
2. If your answer to question one is yes, then answer this question: Was
such defect a direct cause of plaintiff's injuries?
Answer No
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causally negligent and apportioned fault fifty percent to Penney,
thirty percent to NSP, and twenty percent to the plaintiff. The court
entered judgment against Penney for eighty percent of the damages
and ordered NSP to contribute its share.' On appeal,' the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that
one may be negligent in selling a product without a warning label,
even though that product is found by the jury to be not in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff. Bigham v. J. C.
Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978).1
Section Three
1. Was J.C. Penney Co. negligent?
Answer Yes
2. If your answer to Question 1 is yes, then answer this question: Was J.C.
Penney Co's. negligence a direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
Answer Yes
3. Was Northern States Power Co. negligent?
Answer Yes
4. If your answer to Question 3 is yes, then answer this question: Was
Northern States Power Company's negligence a direct cause of the plaintiff's
injuries?
Answer Yes
5. Was plaintiff Vernon Bigham negligent?
Answer Yea
6. If your answer to Question 5 is yes, then answer this question: Was
plaintiff Vernon Bigham's negligence a direct cause of his injuries?
Answer Yes
Special Verdict, Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 36881 (Dist. Ct., Blue Earth Cty.,
June 6, 1976), affl'd, 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978) (warranty questions omitted).
5. NSP was ordered to contribute an amount corresponding to 30% of the total
damages, three-eighths of the amount of the judgment. 268 N.W.2d at 895.
6. Penney and NSP appealed from the order denying their post-trial motions for
judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. Id. at 894.
7. The Bigham court also held that Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d
679 (Minn. 1977), which held that an employer's liability for contribution was not to
exceed available worker's compensation benefits, was not applicable. 268 N.W.2d at
898-99 & n.7. Nevertheless, the supreme court reversed that part of the trial court's
judgment that held NSP responsible for 30% of the damages, reasoning that since
Bigham had assumed the risk of the "flashover," which was the only part of the
accident for which NSP was responsible, he was barred from recovering against NSP.
Id. at 898-99. The assumption of risk defense was not available to Penney, although
the plaintiff assumed the risk of a flashover, he did not assume the risk of exacerbated
injuries caused by the clothing. Id. at 895-96.
In exonerating NSP, the supreme court stated that "[tihe question of NSP's
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury at all, given its finding that
plaintiff had assumed the risk." Id. at 899. The court apparently did not consider the
principle that the negligence of all persons causally at fault must be submitted to the
jury for apportionment of fault, even if some of those persons could not be liable to
the plaintiff. See, e.g., Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1979);
Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Minn. 1978); Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d
918, 923 (Minn. 1978); Connar v. West Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 42, 45,
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Suppliers of consumer goods are subject to liability when their
products are defective and harm results from the defect." When a
supplier has failed to exercise due care in the design or manufacture
of a product, a consumer can recover in a negligence action for injury
caused by that product.' A supplier can also be found liable in negli-
gence for failing to explicitly warn consumers of hazards attending
the use of the product.10 Moreover, if it is foreseeable that the product
may be used in a manner that the supplier does not intend and that
such a use may result in harm, the supplier may be liable for negli-
gently failing to warn against that particular manner of use."
227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1975); Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 430-31, 195 N.W.2d
641, 646 (1972); 4 J. HELAND & 0. ADAmSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, MINNESOTA JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES 148, comment at 128 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA
JIG II]. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, ComPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE § 16.5, at 254-56 (1974).
The supreme court was nevertheless correct in stating that NSP's negligence
should not have been submitted to the jury, although not for the reason it mentioned.
Bigham did not seek damages caused only by the flashover. Instead, he sought dam-
ages for the exacerbated injuries caused by the melt-and-cling effect of the clothing.
Since neither the plaintiff nor NSP caused the exacerbation itself, neither party's
negligence should have been submitted to the jury. See pages 1009-22 infra.
8. Plaintiffs are able to recover from remote distributors as well as the immediate
distributor of a product causing harm, so long as it can be proven that the defect
existed at the time the product left that distributor. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 463, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932). See also Heise v. J.R. Clark Co., 245 Minn.
179, 186, 71 N.W.2d 818, 823 (1958).
9. See Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 325,
79 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1956); Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 339, 340, 51 N.W.
1103, 1105, 1106 (1892). See generally W. PROSSa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 96, at 647 (4th ed. 1971).
10. See, e.g., Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 55, 240
N.W.2d 303, 307 (1976) ("The manufacturer or supplier has the duty to give a reasona-
ble warning as to the dangers inherent, or reasonably foreseeable when using goods in
the manner specified." (quoting, with approval, trial court's instructions to the jury));
Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 11, 148 N.W.2d 312, 318 (1967);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 395 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
11. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 325,
79 N.W. 688, 693 (1956); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 388, comment g. The supplier's
duty is twofold: first, the duty to give adequate instructions for the safe use of the
product, and second, the duty to warn of the dangers inherent in its improper use. See
Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 787-88 (Minn. 1977). See also Clark
v. Rental Equip. Co., 300 Minn. 420, 426-27, 220 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1974) (improper
use of scaffolding was foreseeable and should have been warned against); McCormack
v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496-97 (1967) (in addition to
a duty to provide instructions on the proper use of a vaporizer, manufacturer had duty
to warn of dangers from an accidental overturning of the vaporizer, since overturning
was a foreseeable risk); Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 272, 60
N.W.2d 804, 810 (1953 (manufacturer of gas conversion burner had duty to warn
inexperienced operators that removal of "plug" might result in explosion).
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When a product is defective and harm results, a plaintiff is also
able to recover in strict tort liability even though the supplier has
exercised all possible care.' 2 The elements of strict liability, are set
forth in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. 3 It may be
easier for an injured consumer to recover under a strict liability
theory than in a negligence action, because the plaintiff need only
show that the product was sold in a defective condition that resulted
in harm; the plaintiff need not undertake the difficult and often
expensive task of proving that the supplier breached its duty of rea-
sonable care."
On the other hand, Restatement § 388(b) imposes liability only if the supplier
"has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize
its dangerous condition . .. ." Hence, there is no duty to warn against an obvious
danger. See RESTATN , supra note 10, § 388, comment k.
12. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 402A, comment a. See Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MiNN. L. REv. 791 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973).
13. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 402A provides,
(1) One who sells any products in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to this
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) 'the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
14. See Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence,
19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965). Important policy rationales underlie the willingness of courts to
expand the scope of products liability in this way. First, by marketing his product, the
supplier assumes an obligation to the consuming public. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,
§ 402A, comment c. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Second, the supplier, not the consumer,
has the expertise to guard against risks of injury. See McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278
Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967) ("[IThe consumer. . . possesses neither
the skill nor the means necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of
injury or its disastrous consequences."). Third, the supplier is better able than the
consumer to absorb and spread the costs of product-related injuries. See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). Finally, strict liability provides the manufacturer with an
incentive to take steps necessary to ensure the safe manufacture and use of its prod-
ucts. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 327-28, 188 N.W.2d
426, 431-32 (1971); McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
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The ability of plaintiffs to recover in strict liability is not limited
to cases in which the product itself is flawed."5 Strict liability is also
available as a theory of recovery for injuries caused by products made
unsafe by lack of adequate warning against dangers attendant to
use.' For purposes of strict liability, a product sold without a warning
is in a defective condition if the seller has reason to anticipate that
use of the product without such a warning would be unreasonably
dangerous. If, however, an adequate warning is given, and the prod-
uct is safe if the warning is heeded, the product is not defective or
unreasonably dangerous.'
In 1967, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the trend in
other jurisdictions and expressed its approval of the doctrine of strict
liability" as embodied in section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts.2° In subsequent cases, the Minnesota court has adopted com-
15. When one unit of a particular product is flawed due to a deviation from
standard production procedures, it may be said to have a "unit defect" or "production
defect." A "design defect," by contrast, inheres in every unit of the product, the
inadequacy having occuried at the planning stages. Although all items of the product
conform to the given specifications, those specifications are deficient. A third class of
defect involves a failure to warn when such failure renders the product unreasonably
dangerous. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcrs Luzmnrry, § 16, A[4]
[fl[i], at 3B-118.1 to -119. For an excellent commentary on the meaning of
"defective," see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-29, 573 P.2d 443, 452-53,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234-35 (1978). See also note 38 infra.
16. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th
Cir. 1975) (Minnesota law); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811
(9th Cir. 1974) (Montana law); Basko v. Sterling Drug., 416 F.2d 417, 428 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Connecticut law). See generally Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate
Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Liti-
gation Comes of Age, 61 CoRaNEL L. Rav. 495 (1976).
17. REzTATEME , supra note 10, § 402A, comment h.
18. Id., comment j. There has been some dispute about whether strict liability
for failure to warn is different from liability for negligent failure to warn. Compare
Skaggs v. Clairol, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 584, 587-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (cited in Bigham,
268 N.W.2d at 896-97) (instructions on strict liability misleading and unnecessary
when adequate instructions on negligent failure to warn have been given) and Ander-
son v. Klix Chemical, 256 Or. 199, 203, 472 P.2d 806, 808 (1970), overruled, Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 497-98, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974) (strict liability
for failure to warn is based in negligence) with Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375,
385-87, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107-08 (1976) (refusal to instruct jury on alternative theory of
strict liability in failure-to-warn case was reversible error, as strict liability raises issue
of whether product was unreasonably dangerous whereas negligence deals with reason-
ableness of not warning). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of
Information, 48 Tax. L. REV. 398 (1970); Wade, supra note 12, at 836-37.
19. See McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967).
20. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 16A[3] & n.2 (majority
of states have adopted the rule of strict tort liability).
1979J
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ments h and j of section 402A, which impose strict liability for failure
to warn.2' In Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co.,2 a design
defect case, the supreme court approved the trial court's instruction
that a product sold with warnings is not in a defective condition nor
unreasonably dangerous if it would be safe when used in accordance
with the warnings.? The reasoning of Halvorson suggests that if ade-
quate warnings are not given, the product would be deemed to be in
a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition.24
Strict liability is a broader theory of recovery than is negligence;
courts and commentators recognize that once the plaintiff proves the
elements of negligence in a products liability setting, the elements of
strict liability are established as well.? In Halvorson, the jury found
that even though the plaintiff proved the manufacturer's negligence,
the product was not defective.28 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
these findings to be "inconsistent and irreconcilable, '27 reasoning
that "[i]f a product is not dangerous and defective in the absence
of safety devices, it is not negligence to manufacture it that way."
In Bigham, the jury found that Penney was negligent, presuma-
bly for selling the clothing without a warning label. 29 The jury also
21. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69 (1970)
(citing comment h); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 39, 171 N.W.2d 201,
206 (1969) (comments h and j found to be applicable).
22. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
23. Id. at 54, 240 N.W.2d at 306.
24. See also Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th
Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota law) ("Failure to provide ... warnings will render the
product unreasonably dangerous and will subject the manufacturer to liability for
damages under strict liability in tort."); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32,
39, 171 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1969).
25. The presence of a "defect" or a "defective condition" rendering a product
unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable uses is a common element of both a finding
of negligence and a finding of strict liability. Without proof of a defect there could be
no liability as a matter of law under either theory. Halvorson v. American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 56-58, 240 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (1976). See also Worden v.
Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651 (1976) (whether the suit is in
negligence, warranty, or strict liability, the plaintiff must establish that the injury was
caused by a defective, unreasonably unsafe product (quoting, with approval, W.
PRossFR, supra note 11, § 103, at 671-72)) (dictum); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965).
26. 307 Minn. at 51-52, 240 N.W.2d at 305.
27. Id. The court stated that ordinarily it would remand such inconsistent find-
ings for a new trial, but found that the facts of Halvorson would not justify liability
because the danger was obvious, known, and specifically warned against.
28. Id. at 56, 240 N.W.2d at 307.
29. Although the negligence interrogatory was nonspecific, see note 4 supra,
plaintiff argued on appeal that the general negligence finding represented the jury's
determination that Penny had breached its duty to warn "because the clothing was
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
found, however, that the clothing was not in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff. 0 In attempting to reconcile
the jury's finding of no defect with the finding of negligence, 3' the
court first distinguished Halvorson by reasoning that in Halvorson
the harm was due to a defect in the design of the product whereas in
Bigham the harm was due to the lack of warning about the risks of
using the product. The court stated that a failure to warn has no
bearing on the determination of whether a product is defective;
rather, only the design and manufacturing processes need to be con-
sidered. The court concluded, therefore, that "failure to warn of the
potential hazards from the use of a product is a separate issue,"32 and
affirmed the judgment against Penney.
In a further effort to reconcile the verdict answers, the supreme
court noted that the jury had been instructed that a product is defec-
tive if it is unreasonably dangerous to the "ordinary user. '" The court
reasoned that it was not inconsistent for the jury to find that although
Penny was negligent, presumably for failing to warn the unusual
consumer of dangers inherent in the product, the clothing was not
not labelled as to its flammability." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 14. The court
incorporated this explanation into its decision. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
30. 268 N.W.2d at 896.
31. In its effort to reconcile the answers, the Bigham court relied on federal
constitutional law: "[T]he Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States requires that '[w]here there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers
to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.'" 268 N.W.2d
at 897 (quoting A & G Stevedores v. Ellermann Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). This
argument apparently was uncritically adopted from plaintiff's brief. See Brief of
Plaintiff-Respondent at 11-12. To the extent that this argument suggests that the
states are bound by the Seventh Amendment as a matter of federal law, it is in error.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947). The requirement that answers be reconciled where possible is a matter of
state, not federal law. See, e.g., Crohn v. Dupree, 291 Minn. 290, 293, 190 N.W.2d 678,
680 (1971); Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967) (cited by
Bigham, 268 N.W.2d at 897); Bell v. Northern Pac. Ry., 112 Minn. 488, 493, 128 N.W.
829, 831 (1910); Valerius v. Richard, 57 Minn. 443, 445, 59 N.W. 534, 535 (1894).
32. 268 N.W.2d at 896. Apparently the court meant that liability for failure to
warn involves an issue separate from the question of whether a product is defective.
See notes 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
33. 268 N.W.2d at 897; Record, vol. XIII, at 72. This instruction was from
MINNESOTA JIG I1, supra note 7, 118S, at 98:
A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it leaves the seller's
bands, it is in a condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary
user.
A condition is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous when used by
an ordinary consumer who uses it with the knowledge common to the com-
munity as to the product's characteristics and common usage.
See 268 N.W.2d at 897 & n.4.
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defective because it was safe for an "average consumer.""4
The apparent inconsistency in the jury verdict may have resulted
from the trial court's jury instructions. Although the Restatement
makes it clear that the lack of a warning can render a product defec-
tive,3 the trial court did not state that principle in its instructions."
Instead, the jury was instructed that a defective product is one that
is dangerous "when used by an ordinary consumer who uses it with
the knowledge common to the community as to the product's charac-
teristics and common usage," and that "a product is not defective
when it is reasonably safe for normal use and handling. ' 3 The court
failed to explain to the jury that a product is defective if it is unsafe
34. "In this case, the claimed inconsistencies in the verdict may be resolved to
read that the work clothing was not 'defective' because it was not unreasonably danger-
ous to the average consumer, but that Penney was negligent in selling it without
warning of its flammability." 268 N.W.2d at 897.
The Bigham court also stated, "Plaintiff, whose work subjects him to fire hazards,
is in a position analogous to that of a consumer who has a common allergy. See,
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402A, commentj." 268 N.W.2d at 897 (emphasis in original).
This assertion is illogical. Comment j provides that there is no duty to warn a con-
sumer of the dangers inherent to commonly known allergens such as eggs or milk. In
the view of the court, Bigham did not need to be warned of a danger because his work
made him "allergic" to Penney fabric, in the same way that one's immunity system
might create an allergic reaction to eggs or.milk. The result of the court's analysis is
to eliminate the strict liability action under comment j of Restatement § 402A.
A second problem with the common allergy analogy becomes obvious as the court
develops an explanation of appropriate causes of action. The court follows its reference
to common allergy with a reference to Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 993
(8th Cir. 1969), a case in which a manufacturer was held liable under both § 402A and
the Restatement's negligent-failure-to-warn provision-§ 388. The court in Sterling
Drug observed that the duty-to-warn standard is consistent under § 402A and § 388.
The Bigham court failed to explain how, given the consistency found by the Eighth
Circuit, Minnesota courts could impose liability in negligence when none is found in
strict liability.
The court's common allergy analogy fails on a third level. Although "fire hazards"
might somehow be construed as common allergies, the plaintiff was "sensitive" to
fabric in Bigham, not to fire.
35. RESTATEMFNT, supra note 10, comments h, j. See text accompanying notes 17-
18 supra.
36. The sole reference to failure to warn in the jury instructions was given in
conjunction with the instructions on the elements of negligence: "The seller of goods
has a duty to give a reasonable warning as to the dangers inherent or reasonably
foreseeable when used in goods in the manner of their intended use so long as such
use is one that the seller should reasonably foresee." Record, vol. XIII, at 75-76,
Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978).
37. Id. at 72-73. These instructions conform to the standard jury instructions, see
MINNESOTA JIG II, supra note 7, 118GS at 96-98, with the exception of an optional
sentence that the trial court omitted: "The defect may be in the product itself, in its
preparation, in its container or packaging, or in the instruction necessary for its safe
use." Id.
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due to a lack of warning. This was a serious omission, because the
term "defective" is used in a special sense in a failure-to-warn case,
and failure to instruct the jury on its meaning can easily result in jury
confusion."
Unfortunately, the supreme court did nothing to correct the in-
struction, and its reasoning is likely to engender additional confusion.
The court failed to recognize that a product that is unreasonably
dangerous absent warnings is, for the purposes of strict liability, le-
gally defective.' In holding that Penney could be found negligent for
failing to warn of the dangers attendant to use of the product, but
that such lack of warning did not render the product defective,
Bigham appears to support the position that strict liability is una-
vailable as a theory of recovery in a failure-to-warn case, since the
finding of a "defect" is necessary to impose strict liability." The
effect of Bigham is to relegate all claims based on inadequate and
insufficient warnings to recovery in negligence, thereby preventing
injured consumers with such claims from asserting a strict liability
cause of action.' Plaintiffs in Minnesota would not be permitted to
38. [T]he term "defective" raises many difficulties. Its natural appli-
cation would be limited to the situation in which something went wrong in
the manfacturing process, so that the article was defective in the sense that
the manufacturer had not intended it to be in that condition. To apply it
also to the case in which a warning is not attached to the chattel or the design
turns out to be a bad one or the product is likely to be injurious in its normal
condition, is to use the term in a Pickwickian sense, with a special, esoteric
meaning of its own. It is not without reason that some people, in writing
about it, speak of the requirement of being "legally defective," including the
quotation marks. To have to define the term to the jury, with a meaning
completely different from the one they would normally give to it, is to create
the chance that they will be misled. To use it without defining it to the jury
is almost to ensure that they will be misled.
Wade, supra note 12, at 831-32 (footnotes omitted).
39. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
40. 268 N.W.2d at 897. See note 32 supra.
41. If, as some cases indicate, a showing of negligent conduct by the seller in
failing to warn is a prerequisite for imposition of strict liability, see note 18 supra, then
Bigham may be correct in its implicit restriction of failure to warn to negligence. There
is, however, a difference between strict liability and negligence, both in emphasis and
in proof. The Oregon Supreme Court recognized this distinction: "[An] article can
have a degree of dangerousness because of a lack of warning which~the law of strict
liability will not tolerate even though the actions of the seller were entirely reasonable
.... " Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974).
Whereas negligence focuses on the conduct of the defendant, strict liability is con-
cerned with whether the condition of the product conforms to the reasonable expecta-
tions of the consumer. Id.; see Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385-87, 549 P.2d
1099, 1106-08 (1976). Applying this principle to a failure-to-warn case, a plaintiff in
negligence would have to establish that defendant's conduct was a breach of the duty
of care required of a reasonably prudent seller, while a plaintiff in strict liability would
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merely assert that the product was dangerous to an extent exceeding
consumer expectation because the product lacked a warning; when
failure to warn is at issue the only acceptable trial framework would
be that of determining whether the defendant failed to use due care
in putting the product on the market without a warning."
The Bigham court should have corrected the trial court's instruc-
tions to make them comply with established principles of strict liabil-
ity. When failure to warn is at issue, the judge should instruct the
jury that a product that is not otherwise flawed or improperly made
is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous due to the absence of a
warning of dangers that are inherent in the foreseeable uses of the
product. 3 An alternative and preferable solution would be to aban-
don use of the terms "defect" and "defective" when instructing juries
in failure-to-warn cases. Instead, the trial court should ask by special
interrogatory only whether the product, absent a warning, was unrea-
sonably dangerous to the consumer. If the jury answers affirmatively,
the trial court should then hold that the product was defective, and
impose strict liability.
An additional difficulty with the Bigham court's reasoning is the
apparent limitation of the scope of strict liability to products that are
only be required to show that the product, absent warning, does not meet ordinary
consumer expectations as to safety. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430,
573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978) (design defect); Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
42. It has been a generally accepted practice for plaintiffs to base products liabil-
ity actions on more than one theory of recovery. Commentators have argued, however,
that courts should insist that one theory be chosen and that plainttiffs would then
choose strict liability, since it is the broader, less burdensome theory. Keeton, supra
note 18, at 409 & n.25. Dean Wade has written that the confusion created by permitting
plaintiffs to choose among theories or to bring a separate count on each theory out-
weighs any advantage and is not justifiable. "As time goes on and we have more
experience with the recently developed theories, they will surely merge into a single
tort action." Wade, supra note 12, at 849. Cf. Goblirsh v. Western Land Roller Co.,
310 Minn. 471, 476-77, 246 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1976) (plaintiff not prejudiced by ab-
sence of instruction on implied warranty, since he received benefit of "stronger and
broader instruction on strict liability"). But cf. Hansen v. Cessna, [1978] PROD. LiAB.
REP. (CCH) 8231 (7th Cir. 1978) (Wisconsin law requires juries to be able to consider
multiple bases for recovery, including negligence, because jurors "might be misled by
a strict liability instruction.").
43. At a minimum, the optional sentence in the Jury Instruction Guides, supra
note 7, see note 37 supra, should be given, but it should be modified so that the jury
is informed that the defect can occur not only in inadequate instructions for use, but
also in the lack of warning. If this solution is adopted, the jury should be specifically
charged that a product that is unreasonably dangerous absent adequate warnings is
defective.
44. See note 38 supra; Wade, supra note 25, at 15 ("defect" has no independent
meaning in failure-to-warn cases; "[tihe only real problem is whether the product is
'unreasonably dangerous'" when not accompanied by adequate warnings).
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dangerous to the "ordinary" or "average" consumer. 5 Under section
402A of the Restatement, which imposes strict liability if the product
is unreasonably dangerous to the "ultimate user,"4 the "average" or
"ordinary" status of the user has no bearing on the determination of
whether the product was defective." Instead, strict liability is im-
posed whenever the product is unreasonably dangerous when used in
a foreseeable manner, regardless of the status of the user. 8 The
Bigham court, for unexpressed reasons, believed that the words
"ordinary consumer" in the jury instruction were determinative of
plaintiffs right to recover.' The court does not explain why, having
heard the instruction on defectiveness, a jury would reasonably have
understood that instruction to exclude the unusual user from recov-
ery in strict liability. Furthermore, since the special verdict interroga-
tory specifically asked whether the product was defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous to the plaintiff," it is difficult to infer that a "no"
answer was based on the jury's perceiving Bigham to be a non-
ordinary customer. It is therefore apparent that the standard Minne-
sota strict liability instruction is ambiguous. Problems such as those
in Bigham may be avoided in the future by substituting the less
confusing language of comment i of Restatement section 402A. 5'
Had the jury been properly instructed, the jury's answers to the
special interrogatories could not have been reconciled, and the su-
preme court would have been required to reverse and remand for a
new trial.2 Because the jury instructions were improper, however,
45. 268 N.W.2d at 897. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
46. See note 13 supra.
47. Although the term "ordinary consumer" is found in comment i to § 402A, it
is not used to limit the types of consumers who can recover for unsafe products.
Comment i states that an article that is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics" is "unreasonably dan-
gerous." RESTATEMmNT, supra note 10, § 402A, comment i. "Ordinary consumer" is used
in the Restatement as a standard for determining community knowledge and expecta-
tions, against which the product's dangerousness is measured. The term in no way
limits recovery to ordinary consumers; nor does it provide that only those who use a
product in an ordinary manner may recover under § 402A.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 402A, comment g. Even if an article is safe
for its ordinary or intended use, a plaintiff can still recover if he was injured while using
the product in an unintended but "foreseeable" or "reasonably expected" manner.
See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 428,573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 39, 171 N.W.2d 201, 206
(1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 175 (Miss. 1974). See also Waite
v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 291, 204 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1973).
49. 268 N.W.2d at 897. See note 34 supra.
50. See note 56 infra.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. If the jury had been instructed that a product made unsafe by the lack of a
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there were two possible bases on which the Bigham court could have
resolved the inconsistencies in the answers.
First, the negligence finding and the finding of no defect could
have been explained by reference to the trial court's instructions on
the two theories of recovery. The strict liability instruction defined
defectiveness in terms of dangerousness to an ordinary consumer; 3
the jury could have properly found, therefore, that the clothing would
have been safe when used by an ordinary consumer and thus was not
defective. Since the negligence instruction, however, applied the
broader test of foreseeable use," it may have been appropriate for the
jury to have found that Penney was negligent in failing to warn con-
sumers. Thus, in light of these instructions, the answers were not
necessarily inconsistent. Although this explanation of the inconsis-
tency is plausible, it is not very likely, given that the erroneous strict
liability instruction was not emphasized by the trial court,55 and that
the strict liability interrogatory on the special verdict form did not
use the term "ordinary consumer.""6
The second and more likely explanation for the apparent incon-
sistency is the trial court's treatment of the failure-to-warn issue."
The jury may have failed to find the existence of a defect because the
trial court did not instruct the jury that a product is defective when
the absence of a warning renders it unreasonably dangerous. A find-
ing of negligent failure to warn, therefore, was not inconsistent with
the finding of no defect. By reconciling the answers in this fashion,
the supreme court could have affirmed the judgment without approv-
ing the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in accordance with the
warning is defective, a finding of negligent failure to warn would have been irreconcila-
bly inconsistent with a finding that the product was not defective, and the court would
have had to reverse under the authority of Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
307 Minn. 48, 51-52, 240 N.W.2d 303, 305 (1976). See text accompanying notes 26-28
supra.
53. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
54. See note 36 supra.
55. The term "ordinary consumer" appears once in the 20-page jury charge.
Record, vol. XIII, at 72. At trial, the plaintiff did not take the position that he was
not "an ordinary consumer"; indeed, he claimed the opposite. See Record, vol. XIII,
at 54; note 33 supra. Only on appeal, in his attempt to explain the inconsistency in
the verdict, did plaintiff claim that he was not an ordinary consumer. Brief of Plaintiff-
Respondent at 13-14. In accepting this argument, the supreme court disregarded the
rule that a party may not on appeal assert a position contrary to that taken at trial.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 218 Minn. 454, 457, 16 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1944).
See also Bruno v. Belmonte, 252 Minn. 497, 503, 90 N.W.2d 899, 903 (1958).
56. The special interrogatory on strict liability read, "When J.C. Penney Com-
pany sold the Big Mac work clothing to Mrs. Bigham, was it in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff, Vernon Bigham?" See note 4 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
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principles of strict liability for failure to warn. The court could have
limited its holding to the circumstances of Bigham-in which the
proper instructions were neither requested by counsel nor given by
the trial judge58-while ensuring that juries in future failure-to-warn
cases would be adequately instructed.
Although the Bigham court did attempt to reconcile the answers
on the basis of the instructions given, its reasoning was deficient. By
relying on the trial court's definition of defect, the supreme court has
given that erroneous instruction implicit sanction. In stating that
negligence for failing to warn could be found even though the product
was not defective, the Bigham court has intimated that a failure to
warn does not render a product defective under the principles of strict
liability. Moreover, by not indicating how a jury should properly be
instructed, the court has increased the potential for prejudice to liti-
gants in failure-to-warn cases."
The supreme court's task undoubtedly was made more difficult
by the omissions and errors in the jury instructions. Regrettably, the
reasoning of the supreme court's affirmation of the judgment has
unnecessarily aggravated these errors, perpetuating the incorrect def-
inition of defect in the standard jury instruction, and has thereby
introduced uncertainty into the theoretical basis of liability for fail-
ure to warn. It is hoped that future Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sions will disavow the implications of Bigham and affirmatively
adopt the prevailing principles of strict liability for failure to warn.
58. The court would have been justified in limiting its holding to the circumstan-
ces of the case if it had applied the rule that jury instructions that have been requested
by counsel and given by the court during the trial become the law of the case and are
binding on the jury, court, and counsel. If the instructions are not objected to during
trial or on motion for a new trial, the appellate court will go beyond the law of the case
only to avoid substantial injustice. See, e.g., Erickson v. Sorenson, 297 Minn. 452, 455,
211 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1973); Jacobski v. Prax, 290 Minn. 218, 224, 187 N.W.2d 125,
129 (1971); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 228 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860
(1970). See also note 55 supra.
59. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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